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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
TOD'S TRAVEL CENTER, INC. and 
JOHN P. TROUT 
Appellants, 
v. 
JENKINS OIL COMPANY, INC. 
Appellee, 
APPELLANT BRIEF 
CaseNo.:20020557-CA 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the above- entitied Court by § 78-
2a-3(2)(f), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
There are two issues in this appeal 
1. Did Judge Mower abuse his discretion in entering a default judgment against the 
Plaintiffs in the original case. 
2. In light of the fact that Judge Mower had previously represented one of the 
Plaintiffs, should Judge Mower have recused himself from the case. 
Page 1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review for a judge's abuse of discretion is mat there is no reasonable 
basis for the decision. Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 860 P.2d 937,938 (Utah 
1993). Additionally, the judge's ruling may be overturned if it "is so unreasonable that it 
can be classified as arbitrary and capricious or a clear abuse of discretion." Kunzler v. 
O'Delt, 855 P.2d 270,275 (Utah Ct. of App. 1993). Sea Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State, 
888 P.2d 694,697 (Utah Ct. Of App. 1994). See also State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 
1994). 
The standard of review for judicial recusal or disqualification is that a judge shall 
enter a disqualification in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might be 
reasonably questioned. Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3, E (1). 
CONSTITUTIONAL /STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3, E (1) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. This appeal challenges the dismissal of plaintiffs claims and entry of default judgment 
of defendants counterclaims in Case #970600006, in the Sixth Judicial District Court of 
Garfield County, State of Utah the honorable Judge David L. Mower presiding. The 
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purpose of the Courts is to decide questions of law and facts on their merits after a fair and 
impartial trial. Judge Mower acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in issuing the 
dismissal and entering the default judgment from the bench without the benefit of a fair an 
impartial trial 
2. Prior to being appointed to the bench. Judge David L. Mower represented on of the in 
a civil matter. This relationship left Judge Mower privy to personal details and a 
personal relationship that reasonably could have affected his decisions in this lawsuit 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Plaintiffs Complaint was filed by attorney Martin Bates on March 10,1997. 
2. On March 20,1998, the court filed a notice of intent to dismiss for failure to 
prosecute. 
3. On March 26,1998, plaintiffs retained Dale Sessions to be their attorney of record. 
4. On April 22,1999, attorney Dale Sessions filed a Withdrawal of Counsel 
5. On October 29,1999, the Court ordered that counsel be present at a final pretrial 
conference scheduled for January 6,2000. 
6. On December 15,1999, attorney Dale Sessions withdrew as counsel. 
7. On February 3,2000, the court ordered that Plaintiffs obtain new counsel by March 1, 
2000. 
8. On February 28,2000, attorney Aaron Prisbrey entered his appearance for Plaintiffs 
9. Pretrial is scheduled for April 26,2001. Jury trial set for May 18-23,2001. 
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10. After an interlocutory appeal, jury trial is set for December 17, 18, and 21,2001. 
11. On October 24,2001, Attorney Aaron Prisbrey move to withdraw for non-payment of 
fees. 
12. On November 8,2001 Plaintiffs represent they will be ready for trial in December 
2001. 
13. On December 4,2001, attorney Nelson Abbott enters his appearance for plaintiffs. 
14. On December 10,2001, plaintiffs move to continue the trial. 
15. On December 12,2001, the Court continued the trial date to June 25-28,2002, and 
sanctions Trout $7,500.00 for attorneys' fees for the delay in causing Jenkins Oil to 
hire new counsel. 
16. On May 22,2002, plaintiffs' attorney, Nelson Abbott, files a motion to Withdraw as 
Counsel. 
17. On May 23,2002, a pretrial conference was held and the Court heard arguments 
related to a withdrawal of Plaintiffs' counsel and a Motion for Rule 16(d) sanctions 
filed on behalf of defendants. 
18. The Court granted Nelson Abbott's motion to withdrawal, dismissed plaintifFs case, 
and entered a default judgment for the defendant against plaintiffs. 
19. On July 8,2002, this appeal was filed in the Utah State Court of Appeals. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Judge David L. Mower, on the day of pretrial conference, allowed plaintiffs' attorney 
to withdraw, dismissed plaintiffs' claims, and entered a default judgment in favor of 
the defendant These actions were arbitrary and capricious and should be overturned. 
2. Judge David L. Mower represented one of the plaintifife in a civil matter prior to Judge 
Mower's judicial appointment It is reasonable to believe that intimate, private 
knowledge of the plaintiff and any personal conflicts that may have existed affected 
Judge Mower's disposition of the above listed suit. This contact raises a reasonable 
inference of bias and Judge Mower's impartiality might be reasonably questioned. 
3. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DID JUDGE MOWER ABUSE HIS DISCRETION IN ENTERING A 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF? 
For the Appellate Court to overrule Judge Mower's entry of Default Judgment, it must be shown 
that Judge Mower abused his discretion and or acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner. On the 
date of the pre-trial Judge Mower made three decisions. First, he allowed Plaintiffs attorney to 
withdraw. Second, he dismissed Plaintifife claim. Third, Judge Mower entered a default judgment on 
Defendant's counterclaim. 
It is plain and clear that entering a default judgment is within the authority of the Court It is also 
clear that the same Court (or a higher Court) that entered the default judgment can also set it aside. 
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"The allowance of a vacation of judgement is a creature of equity designed to relieve against harshness 
of enforcing a judgment, which may occur through procedural difficulties, the wrongs of the opposing 
parry, or misfortunes which prevent the presentation of a claim or defense." Board of Education v. 
Cox, 384 P.2d 806,14 Utah 2d 385 (Utah 1963). "The trial court is afforded broad discretion in 
ruling on a motion for relief from judgment under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b)." Birch v. 
Birch, 111 P.2d 1114, (Utah 1989), See also Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 1986); Russell v. 
Martell, 681 P.2d 1193,1194 (Utah 1984). "It is largely within the discretion of the trial court 
whether a default judgment should be relieved, which discretion will not be disturbed unless there is a 
patent abuse thereof." Board of Education v. Cox, 384 P.2d 806,14 Utah 2d 385 (Utah 1963), See 
also Ney v. Harrison, 5 Utah 2d 217,299 P.2d 1114 (Utah 1956); Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 
123 Utah 416,260 P.2d 71 (Utah 1953). 
In entering the default judgment, the Judge Mower ruled that Plaintiff had acted in a dilatory 
manner. However, the truth is just the opposite. On the day of the pretrial, Plaintiff indicated that he 
wanted to proceed and would be ready on the date of trial. Plaintiffs asked for no delay nor change of 
trial date. Plaintiffs simply wanted to terminate his relationship with his attorney for not providing Mr. 
Morse's requests. In fact, at the pre-trial conference, Mr. Trout had in his possession the witaess list 
requested by Mr. Morse, While the termination of this attorney /client relationship could be a 
consideration in the dismissing of a case, the "most important consideration is whether injustice may 
result from the dismissal." Westinghouse v. Larsen, 544 P.2d 876,1975 UT198 (Utah 1975). 
The entry of a default judgment is a drastic measure and should not be used without consideration 
to available options. 'The purpose of courts is to decide questions of law and facts on their merit after 
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a fair and impartial trial, and promote Justice under the law. Decisions on procedural defects should 
not be encouraged." Board of Education v. Cox, 384 P.2d 806,14 Utah 2d 385 (Utah 1963). 
Options open to the Court included not allowing Plaintiffs' counsel to withdraw. It is well within 
the purview of the Courts to deny the motion allowing counsel to withdraw. It was argued by Mr. 
Morse that the withdrawal of Mr. Abbott was a delaying tactic. If the Court agreed with that 
reasoning, the Court could simply have denied the motion and the trial would have proceeded. Even 
without an attorney, the Court could have allowed the trial to go forward, as requested by Plaintiffs, 
requiring Mr. Trout to acquire representation or face default on the date of trial. Either of these 
solutions would have accomplished the goal, having the trial on the scheduled date, without the extreme 
measure of entering a default judgment or without prejudice to Defendants. 
Judge Mower chose the most extreme option available to him and thereby deprived Plaintiffs of 
their day in Court. Judge Mower abased his judicial discretion and acted in an arbitrary manner. 
POINT n 
SHOULD JUDGE MOWER HAVE RECUSED HIMSELF SINCE HE HAD 
PREVIOUSLY REPRESENTED ONE OF THE PLAINTIFFS? 
The Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3, E (1), directs that "a judge shall enter a 
disqualification in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned". This language indicates two main themes. First, there is no discretion in this 
matter. The use of the term "shall" indicates that it is immaterial whether the judge 
believes in his own impartiality, or whether the judge gets acquiescence from all parties 
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involved. If there is a reasonable question of impartiality, the judge shall enter his/her 
disqualification. 
Second, there only needs to be circumstances where the judge's impartiality might be 
questioned. There does not need to be clear and convincing proof, only circumstances 
indicating questionable impartiality. This is a very low threshold for the obvious reasons. 
The Code of Judicial Conduct lists many instances which requires disqualification of 
the presiding judge. First and foremost on the list is "(a) the judge has a personal bias or 
prejudice concerning a party". Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3, E (1 )(a). Judge Mower 
represented one of the Plaintiffs in a civil action prior to being appointed to the bench. 
Did this relationship create a personal bias or prejudice between Judge Mower and the 
Plaintiff? hi truth, we'll never know. But, more importantly, it doesn't matter. What 
matters is whether that relationship might reasonably have created circumstances indicating 
bias or prejudice. There conclusively is a reasonable inference of bias based on the prior 
representation. 
CONCLUSION 
In the interests of justice, this Court can and should set aside this default judgment and re-instate 
Plaintiff Claim and Answer to Counterclaim. It clear that tliere was no intent to delay trial, only to get 
representation that would follow Mr. Trout's wishes. Plaintiffs neither requested nor expected any 
extension of the trial date. "It is indeed commendable to handle cases with dispatch and to move 
calendars with expedition in order to keep them up to date. But it is even more important to keep in 
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mind that the very reason for the existence of courts is to afford disputants an opportunity to be heard 
and to do justice between them. In conformity with that principle the courts generally tend to favor 
granting relief from judgments where there is any reasonable excuse, unless it will result in substantial 
prejudice or in injustice to the adverse party." Wesdnghouse v. Larseny 544 P.2d 876,1975 UT 198 
(Utah 1975). The entry of the Default Judgment was a clear abuse of discretion when there were so 
many viable, less extreme options available to Judge Mower. 
In the alternative, this Court should direct for a trial de novo, based on the failure of Judge 
Mower to recuse himself from the above entitled lawsuit In representing one of the Plaintiffs' in a prior 
matter, Judge Mower has create a circumstance where there is a reasonable question of impartiality. 
Under the Canon of Judicial Conduct Canon 3, E(l) the judge shall disqualify himself in that 
circumstance. Judge Mower failed to disqualify himself and thereby created a reasonable question of 
impartiality. 
this DATED t i  ^ 7 day of May 2003 
Be 
Attorneyafcr Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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